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There is extensive evidence indicating a negative risk–return relation when a ﬁrm’s performance
is measured based on accounting measures, such as its Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity
(ROE). Previous studies show that the risk-return paradox can be explained by the prospect theory,
which predicts that managers’ risk attitudes are different for ﬁrms with differing performance. This
study will test whether there is a risk-return paradox in the context of Indonesian companies. This
study uses ROA and its standard deviation to define return and risk. Industry level and market level
median ROA are used as reference points. Three control variables (firm size, leverage as a proxy of
firm risk, and company age) are included in the model to increase the robustness of this research. A
new sample of nine industries (about 488 firms) over a 10-year period (2008-2017) provides strong
evidence that the risk-return paradox exists in Indonesia. In particular, firms which are below their
target level are found to be risk takers (Hl) while organizations above their target level are risk averse
(H2); moreover, the below-target slope was generally steeper than the above-target slope (H3). These
results support the basic propositions of the prospect theory.
Keyword: Bowman’s paradox, prospect theory, risk-return paradox
JEL Classification: G32, G40, G41

Introduction
Various studies have been conducted in
many countries to find the relation between risk
and return. According to the classical proposition, which is mostly based on the expected
utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgensten,
1944), the risk-return relation is assumed to be
positive (high risk, high return). The positive
relationship could be interpreted as risk-averse
behavior by a company for its returns. There
are some theories determining asset price, such
as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by
Sharpe(1964) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
(APT) by Ross(1976) which are based on the

classical assumption. Although the theories are
still used as the basis for analysis in financial
management, much of the empirical evidence
shows opposite results.
The result of Bowman’s study (1980) is one
of the distinctive samples that proved a negative relationship between risk and return, which
is known as the risk-return paradox. Based on a
sample of firms in 85 US industries over a nineyear sample period, Bowman found such a negative relation between Return on Equity (ROE)
and ROE variance. This paradox was then studied by many other researchers. One of the most
interesting results is the prospect-theory-based
risk-return paradox developed by Fiegenbaum
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and Thomas (1988) and Fiegenbaum (1990).
They show that the paradox can be explained by
the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), which said that investors have different
risk attitudes toward gain and loss situations,
measured against specific reference points. By
adopting Fiegenbaum’s model (1990), Chou,
Chou, and Ko (2009) also studied Bowman’s
paradox by utilizing median market returns and
industry returns as their reference points, instead of the median industry return only, as was
used by Fiegenbaum (1990).
Based on the previous empirical studies,
there are three important results, namely: (1)
Negative relation of risk-return exists for companies having returns below their target levels
(or reference points); (2) positive relationship
exists for companies with returns above their
target, and (3) the below-target trade-off is generally steeper than that for the above-target.
These results also support Bowman’s paradox,
since the estimate of the slope’s term is dominated by the below-target companies, which
have a greater negative risk-return relation.
Many studies about the risk-return relation did not incorporate control variables in
their models, therefore, control variables are
included in our study, and are there to obtain
a robust model. By using the case of Indonesian companies, our study tries to examine the
prospect-theory-based Bowman’s paradox by
employing industry level and market level median return on asset (ROA) reference points as
Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009) suggested and provided more recent evidence on the risk-return
relation. Inclusion of the companies’ size, their
leverage as their risk proxy, and age as control
variables is done as suggested by Gupta (2017).
The objectives of the study are: (1) To analyze the risk-return relations of companies
wih returns below the refrence point, both for
industry and market levels; (2) to analyze the
risk-return relations of companies with returns
above the refrence point, both for industry and
market levels; and (3) to know the magnitude of
the relation risk and the returns of the companies with returns below and above the reference
points, both for industry and market levels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
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Section 2 discusses the literature reviews and a
summary of the previous research into the riskreturn paradox. Section 3 describes the hypotheses, the data and the empirical methodology.
Section 4 presents the empirical results and
Section 5 concludes the paper.

Literature Review
Risk-Return Relationship
The relationship between risk and return has
received considerable attention from research
into business administration, economics, and finance. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), Brealey and Myers (1981) all suggest that risk and
return are positively correlated.
As stated by Fiegenbaum and Thomas
(1988), positive risk-return relationships have
commonly emerged in cross-sectional studies
examining both industry-level and firm-level
data, even when the researchers controlled for
the industry effect. Conrad and Plotkin (1968)
found a statistically significant positive relationship between risk and return from 783 US
companies representing 59 industries during
their observation period from 1950 to 1965. The
industry effect was included in the research.
Similar results were also founded by Fisher
and Hall (1969) and Hurdle (1974), who used
a smaller sample size and period (11 industries,
15 years’ sample period and 39 industries, 10
years’ sample period). Cootner and Holland
(1970) incorporated a time effect, aside from
industrial control and discovered a significant
positive risk-return relationship (industry effect
was consistent for every year). The relationship
appears to hold regardless of the firms' national
identities. More than 300 West German firms
used as samples in Neumann, Bobel, and Haid
(1979) also showed a significant positive result.
Surprisingly, there is also much research
that shows the opposite finding. Negative riskreturn relationships emerge when alternative
measures are included in the studies. Such
measures range from the nature of the industry,
the time period studied, firm size, diversification strategies, risk measures, and risk attitudes
(Armour and Teece (1978), Bowman (1980),
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Bowman (1982), Treacy (1980), Fiegenbaum
and Thomas (1985), Fiegenbaum and Thomas
(1986), Bettis (1981), Bettis and Hall (1982),
and Bettis and Mahajan (1985)).
Armour and Teece (1978) found a negative
relationship although it was not statistically
significant from a sample of 28 US petroleum
firms. Treacy (1980) used size effect to control
the behavior and found a negative relationship
for risk and return. Bowman (1980) examined
the risk-return relation of US companies across
85 industries. The results found a negative riskreturn relation in most industries. It was the first
research which shows an anomaly in the riskreturn relation at the organizational level, called
the risk-return paradox. He named it ‘paradox’
since it ran counter to the well believed positive
relationship expected by economists (Fiegenbaum, 1990).
According to Bowman (1980), there are several factors that cause contradictitory evidence
compared to the classic positive risk-return relation. First, a good manager, having the ability to create higher profit levels with lower risk
levels, thru making good decisions such as
choosing the right project, right strategy, and
right implementation procedure, all become
drivers for creating this paradox. Second, a
manager cannot have a risk-averse character, so
he would choose higher risks even though there
is a lower profit level. This is caused by managers’ less risk-averse behavior and will also
cause such a paradox.
The same result is shown by Bowman (1982).
He conducted a deeper analysis to prove that
firms in trouble would exhibit a stronger negative relationship within industries. Three industries are included as the samples (food processing, computers, and containers) and resulted in
significant negative associations for troubled
firms within these industries.
Negative risk-return relationships are more
common when measures are accounting-based
rather than market-based (Fiegenbaum and
Thomas (1985), Fieganbaum and Thomas
(1986)). Finally, the evidence about diversification strategies and risk indicates that related
diversification strategies exhibit negative riskreturn associations, whereas unrelated strat-

egies exhibit a positive relationship (Bettis
(1981), Bettis and Hall (1982), Bettis & Mahajan (1985)).
Behavioral Decision Theory and Risk Taking
Most of the literature dealing with risky
choice behavior assumes that decision makers are risk averse. That assumption is a basic
premise of much of the research into business,
finance, economics, and management science.
In terms of the utility theory, the assumption
implies that a decision maker has a utility function that is uniformly concave or that individuals depart from risk-averse behavior only
under unusual circumstances. Many researchers (Friedman and Savage (1948), Markowitz
(1952), Grayson (1959), and Swalm (1966))
have questioned global risk aversion on both
theoretical and empirical grounds. Their research found that the utility functions are not
uniformly concave.
Friedman and Savage (1948) proposed a theoritical utility function with a mixture of risk
seeking and risk aversion. Three segments of
the function are convex (risk seeking) and are
surrounded by two concave segments. Markowitz (1952) proposed a four-segment bounded
utility function of wealth (convex-concaveconvex(around present wealth)-concave). An
empirical study by Grayson (1959) also showed
similar results. With nine executives, who are
engaged in oil and gas drilling decisions, used
as the sample, Grayson (1959) found a mixture
of risk seeking and risk aversion in the domain
of losses and evidence of risk-seeking behavior
for gains. Swalm (1960) conducted research to
analyze the behavioral decisions of 13 executives in the chemical industry, which resulted
in nine out of the 13 utility functions being risk
averse for gains and risk seeking for losses.
Recent advances in the behavioral decision
theory (Fishburn (1977), Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979), Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
Laughhunn, Payne, and Crum (1980)) have emphasized the role of reference, or target, levels in
the analysis of risky choices. Current evidence
reveals that most individuals exhibit a mixture
of risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior, with
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the range of the returns where those two risk
preferences are the predominant modes of behavior being intimately connected with the notion of a target return. For returns below-target,
most individuals appear to be risk seeking. For
returns above-target, a large majority appear
to be risk averse, which is consistent with one
of the main predictions of the prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Behavioral Decision and Risk-Return
Relationship
The prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky suggests that each individual will act differently in a different situation. The situation is divided into two, a gain and loss situation. Then,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) described that
there is a reference point for each individual,
used as the reference to determine whether the
individual is in a gain or loss position. The concept is then used as the research base for decision making at the organizational or company
level, which is conducted by other researchers (Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), Fiegenbaum (1990), Miller and Bromley (1990),
Jegers (1991), Johnson (1993), Kliger and Tsur
(2011)). From many theories, one of the wellknown theories is the prospect-theory-based
risk-return relation research by Fiegenbaum
and Thomas (1988). They proposed that Bowman’s risk-return paradox can be described by
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory at the organizational level. By using Spearman’s correlation test, they found a negative
risk-return relation in companies with returns
below the reference point and a positive riskreturn relation in the companies with returns
above the reference point. Fiegenbaum and
Thomas’s (1988) findings are in line with the
behavioral assumptions of the prospect theory;
that most firms may be risk seeking when they
are suffering losses or are below their targeted
return levels. Conversely, they will tend to be
risk averse following the achievement of their
targeted returns. The prospect theory describes
that an individual will show risk-seeking behavior below the reference point, so the paradox would be shown in companies with returns
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below their reference point.
Fiegenbaum (1990) used new samples of
about 3,300 firms across 85 industries to conduct a further examination of the risk-return relation under the prospect theory’s explanation
by using regression as the method of analysis.
In general, the empirical findings provide further support for the argument that the prospect
theory could explain the risk-return paradox.
Fiegenbaum’s (1990) study was built upon Fiegenbaum and Thomas’s (1980) approach to explain the risk-return relation. The diffference is
Fiegenbaum (1990) tried to estimate the tradeoff between risk and return rather than confirming that it obeys the risk-averse and risk-seeking
behavior. However, Fiegenbaum only analyzed
the risk-return relation at industy level.
Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009) studied the riskreturn relation in 27,416 companies selected
from 45 industries in the United States, based
on Fiegenbaum’s (1990) approach. However,
Chou, Chou and Ko (2009) tried to investigate
not only at the industry level but also at the
market level. In their observational period from
1984 until 2003, they found a negative risk-return relation in companies with returns below
the reference point, both at the market and industry levels. The research also found a positive risk-return relation in the companies with
a return level above the reference point both at
the market and industry levels. Although any
extreme observations have been trimmed, the
results are still consistent.
More recent study by Patel, Li, and Park
(2017) assessed the generalizability of Bowman’s paradox across 12,235 firms in 28 countries. Using median ROA as reference point,
Both cross-sectional and longitudinal relationship between risk and return provided broad
support for the presence of Bowman’s paradox in diverse country settings (Asia, Europe,
and South Africa), except for India, Japan, and
South Korea where the relationship was positive. Patel, Li, and Park (2017) confirmed that
Bowman’s paradox generally held across diverse institutional and cultural settings and supported prior studies on Bowman’s risk paradox
drawn from the US sample
Many other researchers including Jegers
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Table 1. Summary of risk-return paradox empirical studies
Studies
Return
Bowman
(1980)
Fiegenbaum
and Thomas
(1988)
Fiegenbaum
(1990)

Measurement
Risk

ROE

Reference
Point
Quartile

Companies

Sample
Industry

Period

Findings

1,587

85

1968-1976

Negative risk-return relation

Median

2,322

45

1960-1979

Negative relation below reference
point and positive relation above
reference point
Negative relation below reference
point and positive relation above
reference point
Did not support prospect-theorybased risk-return paradox

ROE

Content
Analysis
Variance

ROA

Variance

Median

330

85

1977-1982

Miller and
Bromiley
(1991)

ROA and
ROE

Mean

746,526

-

1978-1982

Jegers
(1991)

ROA and
ROE

Income
Variability,
market risk,
and strategic
risk
Variance

Median

3,250

110

1977-1982

Sinha (1994)

ROA

Standard
Deviation

Median

341

22

1977-1985

Chou, Chou,
and Ko
(2009)
Patel, Li, and
Kim (2017)

ROA and
ROE

Standard
Deviation

Median

27,416

45

1984-2003

ROA

Standard
Deviation

Median

12,235

41

1998-2002

(1991), Johnson (1993), and Sinha (1994) also
obtained similar results to the prospect-theorybased risk-return relation. The study by Miller
and Bromiley (1991) is one of the studies which
did not support the findings of Fiegenbaum and
Thomas (1988) and Fiegenbaum (1990). A
summary of the previous research into the riskreturn paradox is shown in the table above.

Hypotheses and Research
Methodology
The hypotheses in this research are adopted
from Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009). Determining the reference point is the most important
part of the prospect theory. In Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), there is no clear explicit description of how they determined the reference
points. However, there are many researchers
using either the median or mean of company
returns as their reference points. Although Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) argued that such
a mixture of risk attitudes may exist both within
and across industries, most research, including
that by Fiegenbaum (1990) and Patel, Li, and
Park (2017), only use the industry return me-

Negative relation below reference
point and positive relation above
reference point
Negative relation below reference
point and positive relation above
reference point
Negative relation below reference
point and positive relation above
reference point
Negative relation below reference
point and positive relation above
reference point

dian as the reference point. To obtain evidence
of different behavior at the industry and market
levels, this research used the median of industry
and market returns as its reference point, which
is similar to Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009).
Based on previous studies, the Return on Assets (ROA) or Return on Equity (ROE) could
be used as a proxy for the company’s return.
Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009) used both ROA and
ROE as the proxy of company returns. In this
research, only ROA was used as the company
return, since the research samples are taken
across industries in the market.The standard
deviation of return is used as a risk proxy, as in
Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009)
Either in Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988)
or Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009), the hypotheses’ development are based on Kahneman and
Tvesrky (1979). The prospect theory describes
that an individual will show risk-seeking behavior below the reference point. By assuming
that the company will attempt to turn a position
of loss into one of gain, a company with returns
below the reference point will take bigger risks
(Kliger, 2011). Bigger company losses will lead
to bigger company risks, which are shown by

5
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2019

5

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 [2019], Art. 1
R. S. Sajjad and M. Asri / Indonesian Capital Market Review 11 (2019) 1-14

a higher standard deviation return. Contrary to
this, a smaller company loss (showing a closer position to the reference point) will lead to
smaller company risks, and this is shown by a
lower standard deviation return. Thus, it is expected that there will be a negative risk-return
relation in a company with returns below the
reference point.
Different behavior is shown by a company
with returns above the reference point. Based
on the prospect theory, a company will show
risk-averse behavior when it is positioned
above the reference point. By assuming that the
company won’t take a greater risk if it creates a
smaller return than its risk, the risk-return relation is assumed to be positive.
According to Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), the prospect theory’s value curve shape
resembles an asymmetric S. The curve in the
loss area will have a steeper slope or gradient
than in the gain area. Such behavior is called
loss aversion. By the above assumption, the
company’s behavior will also indicate the same
thing. The function slope of the risk-return relation in a company with its return below the
reference point is expected to be greater than
that of a company with its return above the reference point.
Based on the above description, the hypotheses to be tested in this research are the following:
Hypothesis 1: A negative relation between risk
and return exists for ﬁrms performing below the
target level.
Hypothesis 2: A positive relation between risk
and return exists for ﬁrms performing above the
target level.
Hypothesis 3: The relation between risk and return is steeper for ﬁrms that underperform the
target level than the relation for ﬁrms that outperform the target level.
The three hypotheses will be tested at the
market level with the reference point being the
market and industry levels. Our research used

all public companies registered on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in the period from 2008
until 2017. The period and samples were selected to examine Bowman’s paradox in Indonesian companies during the last decade. Then,
the companies were grouped again into nine
industries based on the Jakarta Stock Industrial
Classification (JASICA)1.
To determine the risk-return relation in the
context of an organization, based on the prospect theory, it is necessary to build an arithmetic model which then will be tested in this
research. The model used in this research is a
development of the model used in the research
by Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009) as well as by
Gupta (2017). The model will test the riskreturn relation if a company obtained a return
above or below the reference point. Also, it will
determine how the manager’s attitude towards
risk leads to different company decision-making behavior. The initial model, by Fiegenbaum
(1990), that was developed by Chou, Chou, and
Ko (2009) is shown below:
Riskij=ai+biReturnij+εij
Where i = 1,…, m; j = 1,…, Ni. ai is the intercept term for industry i, and bi is the slope
coefﬁcient of the risk–return relation for industry i. To make a more robust model, our research will add three control variables, namely
company size, leverage, and company age. The
control variables are taken from the research by
Gupta (2017). Woo (1987) stated that a company with great market power will create a higher
return for a smaller risk and will be one of the
causes of the risk-return paradox. Company
size also directly affects this, so that the use of
these variables can describe the market power
(Gupta, 2017). In addition to the company’s
size, the company’s age also directly affects the
market power, so the use of these variables can
describe the market power.
The research by Miller and Bromiley (1991)
mentioned that already-exist-risks in a company can also affect that company’s performance.

Based on JASICA, industries are classified into 9 industrial groups (agriculture, mining, basic industry and chemicals,
miscellaneous, consumer goods, property, real estate, and building construction, infrastructure, utilities, and transportation,
finance, trade, service, and investment.)

1
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Table 2. Summary of operationalization of variables used in the research
Variable
Return (ROA)
Risk (RISK)

Operationalization of variable

RISK=σROAi

Company Size (SIZE)
Leverage (DER)
Company Age (AGE)

Difference between the last year of the obseravtion period and the
year the company was established

Where i = 1,…, m companies; t = 1,…, N yearsi; n = number of data; σ = standard deviation, Σ = Sum.

This is caused by companies that already have
a high degree of variability in their performance (ROA and ROE), triggering investor
distrust. That makes it necessary for the investors to obtain greater incentives. The amount
of incentives will lead to increased transaction
costs, so that the company's performance will
be reduced. Gupta (2017), in his study, used the
debt-to-equity ratio as a proxy of the company's risk variable. This is because the leverage
of debt obligations will increase the company's
risk variability. After adding the control variables, the model used for this research’s hypotheses testing is as follows:
RISK=α+b1ROA+b2SIZE+b3DER+b4AGE+εij
Where α is the intercept term for industry,
and b1,2...i is the slope coefﬁcient of the independent variables. RISK is the standard deviation of the ROA, ROA is the median return of
ROA, SIZE is the mean of the company total
assets2, DER is the mean of companies debtto-equity ratio, and AGE is the difference between the last year of the obseravtion period
and the year the company was established. The
three hypotheses are tested entirely by using the
above model with the reference level being the
market and industry median ROA. A table of
the operationalization of variables is shown in
table 2.
For the market reference point, the hypotheses are tested by cross-sectional regressions for

both groups. The first group are the companies
with returns above their reference point with
the median reference point of market return,
and the second group are those companies with
returns below their reference point with the median reference point of market return. Initially,
data from all the companies are sorted, from the
ones with the lowest returns to the highest one.
Then, they are divided by two (median) and
used as the reference point for the market level.
The data are then grouped into two, namely all
the companies with returns above the market
reference point and below the market reference
point. Afterwards, both groups are tested.
For the industry reference point, the hypotheses are tested by cross-sectional regressions
for both groups. The groups are the companies
with returns above their reference point with the
median return of the industry as the first group,
and the companies with returns below their reference point with the median return of industry
as the second group. The data are initially divided into nine different industry groups. Then,
a reference point for each industry from the
median ROA is chosen as the reference point,
and the data for each industry is divided into
the two groups listed above. After all of them
are divided, the data are placed into two groups,
namely all the companies with the returns on
the industry reference point and below the industry reference point. Finally, the hypotheses’
testing is conducted on both groups.
The hypotheses testing used a cross-section-

Following the Gupta (2017) research that used non-logged total company assets as a proxy of company size, we did
not transform “SIZE” measured (Tompany Asset) into logged version, which can be found in the common practice.
The non-logged version in this research also showed a good statistical results, hence it was not necessarily needed to be
transformed.

2
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for companies below market reference point (Median ROA =
4.36%)
Mean
Maximum
Minimum
Observations

ROA(%)
-2.54
4.32
-45.25
244

RISK(%)
9.15
50.52
0.18
244

SIZE (IDR)
1,610,000,000,000
51,051,147,545,000
7,859,562,000
244

DER(Ratio)
4.46
317.50
-61.22
244

AGE (Years)
32.05
106
5
244

Table 4. Descriptive statistics for companies above market reference point (Median ROA =
4.36%)
Mean
Maximum
Minimum
Observations

ROA(%)
11.21
36.97
4.36
244

RISK(%)
6.67
31.88
0.39
244

al regression with an Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) model with the EVIEWS 10.0 application. If the data from the regression results
did not meet the classical assumption test, then
an alternative method, the Generalized Least
Square (GLS) was used. GLS is a weighted
least square regression model with variance
as the weighting in the regression model. This
regression model is used when there is a specific correlation problem causing one or more
of the classical assumptions not to be met. By
this method, the estimates are assumed to meet
the classical assumptions and have BLUE (Best
Linear Unbiased Estimator) characteristics.

Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the selected
variables are provided in tables 3,4,5 and 6. As
explained previously, our study would separately regress the samples categorized into four
groups. The first two groups are companies
with returns below and above the market reference points. The last two groups are companies
with returns below and above the industry reference points.
There were 604 companies listed on the Bursa Efek Indonesia (Indonesian Stock Exchange)
up to 2017. With our observation period (20082017), 488 companies are obtained as research
objects. The difference in the numbers is caused
by eliminating companies that did not publish
their financial reports consistentlyfor 2 years.
8
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SIZE (IDR)
5,200,000,000,000
154,280,898,909,000
4,041,113,000
244

DER(Ratio)
1.66
89.22
-13.01
244

AGE (Years)
36
161
3
244

All the obtained samples were distributed between each group. The median ROA for both
the industry and market levels was used as the
reference point. From the grouping process, all
the groups have an equal number of obsevations (244 each).
With a median ROA value of 4.36, Table
3 indicates companies with returns below the
market reference point and Table 4 indicates
companies with returns above the market reference point. From Table 3, the lowest ROA obtained is -45.25 with a maximum value for ROA
of 4.32. It shows that the biggest average net
loss generated is 45.25% of the total assets and
the maximum average net income generated is
4.32% from its total assets, 0.04% lower than
the market’s target net income (4.36%). It indicates a loss position for all of the first group’s
companies. Table 4 indicates that the minimum
average net income generated from a company
with a return above the market reference point
is 4.36% of its total assets. The maximum average net income generated is 36.97% from its
total assets.
The maximum mean average ROA for group
1 was valued at -2.54 indicating a worse belowtarget company performance than that of the
above-target companies (Table 4) which was
valued at 11.21. It implies that on average, a
company with a return above the reference
point at the market level displays about 13.75%
better performance than a company with a return below the reference point at market level.
Table 3 also shows that the mean average
risk for the below-target market return group is
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for companies below the industry reference point (Median
ROA = different for each industry3)
Mean
Maximum
Minimum
Observations

ROA(%)
-2.39
7.48
-45.25
244

RISK(%)
8.90
50.52
-0.80
244

SIZE (IDR)
2,010,000,000,000
51,051,147,545,000
7,859,562,000
244

DER(Ratio)
4.80
317.51
-22.67
244

AGE (Years)
32
106
4
244

Table 6. Descriptive statistics for companies below the industry reference point (Median
ROA = different for each industry2)
Mean
Maximum
Minimum
Observations

ROA(%)
11.33
53.46
2.58
244

RISK(%)
6.84
31.88
0.39
244

9.15%, almost 3% higher than the above-target
market return group (6.66%). That value indicates that on average, a company with a return
below the market level reference point exhibits a greater risk than that of an above-target
company. Group 1 also have less average total
assets (about 1.6 IDR trillion) compared with
the second group (5.2 IDR trillion), indicating
firms with greater assets would generate bigger
returns for smaller risks. It showed the same behavior as Woo (1987) stated. A company with
great market power will create a higher return
with a smaller risk, and will be one of the causes of the risk-return paradox.
Companies with returns below the reference point also have a bigger debt-to-asset ratio
(4.46), almost three times higher than that of the
above reference point companies, which is valued at 1.65 (Table 4). This indicates firms with
internal risks tend to be more risky, as Miller
and Bromiley (1991) proposed. The average
age for below-target companies (32 years) is
younger than that of the above target companies (36 years). This indicates that firms that are
older generate bigger returns with smaller risks
compared to younger ones. According to Woo
(1987), this behavior would trigger the paradox
behavior of risk and return.
The descriptive statistic results for the group
with median industry ROA are shown in tables
5 and 6. The overall result of the descriptive
statistics is quite similar to that of the first two

SIZE (IDR)
4,970,000,000,000
154,280,898,909,000
4,041,113,000
244

DER(Ratio)
1.65
89.21
-13.61
244

AGE (Years)
36
161
3
244

groups. Companies with returns below the industry reference point tend to yield smaller returns (even negative returns) than companies
with returns above the industry reference point
and face bigger risks. Larger and older companies also tend to generate bigger returns for
smaller risks. Companies with bigger debt-toequity ratios are also more risky and generate
smaller returns (Miller and Bromiley, 1991).
From all of the explanations above, it can be
inferred that whether they use the median market return or the median industry return as the
reference point, companies with returns below
and above the reference point would show similar risk and return behavior.

Result and Discussion
Results of the data’s analysis conducted by
this research strongly support the prospect-theory-based Bowman’s paradox, which proposed
different decision-making behavior in different conditions. In this case, different behavior
is shown at the organizational level. In this research, the results produce the same relationship direction as the hypotheses used in the
research by Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988),
Fiegenbaum (1990), and Chou, Chou, and Ko
(2009). According to them, the risk-return paradox is only shown by companies with returns
below the reference points. Tables 7 & 8 show
the results of the regression at the market level

Median return of each industry are: Agriculture= 6, mining= 2.58%, basic industry and chemicals= 3.52%, miscellaneous=
3.27%, consumer goods= 7.37%, property, real estate, and building construction= 5.72%, infrastructure, utilities, and
transportation= 4.17%, finance= 1.79%, trade, service, and investment= 4.12%.

3
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Table 7. Risk–return relation for the below- and above-target ﬁrms at the market level
This table reports summary statistics of the slopes of the following cross-sectional regression:
RISK=α+b1ROA+b2SIZE+b3DER+b4AGE+εij
Statistic
Intercept
ROA
SIZE
DER
AGE
f-statistics
Adjusted R-Squared

Below industry median
coefficients
t-statistics
7.10
13.29***
-0.88
-23.06***
-1.53
7.29***
-0.02
-3.28***
0.05
3.19***
187.28***
0.88

Above industry median
coefficients
t-statistics
5.06
12.52***
0.23
6.83***
-4.79
-2.80***
0.03
2.72***
-0.001
-1.69*
15.20***
0.36

*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level.

Table 8. Risk–return relation for the below- and above-target ﬁrms at the industry level
This table reports summary statistics of the slopes of the following cross-sectional regression:
RISK=α+b1ROA+b2SIZE+b3DER+b4AGE+εij
Statistic
Intercept
ROA
SIZE
DER
AGE
f-statistics
Adjusted R-Squared

Below industry median
coefficients
t-statistics
6.26
9.03***
-0.80
-26.41***
-3.61
7.64*
-0.03
-4.54***
0.06
3.23***
381.44***
0.94

Above industry median
coefficients
t-statistics
2.37
2.20**
0.36
6.09***
1.08
0.32
1.43
5.08***
-0.07
-2.53**
13.97***
0.40

*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level.

and industry level reference points.
The coefficient of the ROA variable describes
the negative risk-return relation for companies
below the reference point. This indicates the
risk-return paradox in the companies below the
reference point, as described by Fiegenbaum
and Thomas (1988), Fiegenbaum (1990), Chou,
Chou, and Ko (2009) for both reference point
levels. The below the reference points’ group
regression result supports the first hypothesis.
From the table above, it can be seen that there
is a positive risk-return relation for companies
above the reference points in both levels. This
is shown by the positive coefficient of ROA.
The results are similar to previous research by
(Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), Fiegenbaum
(1990), Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009)). It also
supports the second hypothesis. Based on Table
7, the coefficient of RISK for a company above
the reference point at the market level is valued
at 0.23. It is smaller than the slope coefficient
of below-target companies. Thus, there is a
stronger risk-return relation in the below-target
companies. The results are also similar for the
10
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industry level regression. This is in accordance with the statement in the third hypothesis
and the result is in line with previous research
(Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), Fiegenbaum
(1990), Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009).
Our research results can be strengthened by
looking at the risk-return relation graph (figures
1&2). The downward trend line for the companies below the reference point indicates a negative risk-return relation, and vice versa. In addition, it can be seen that the risk-return relation
for the companies under the reference point is
steeper than that for the companies above the
reference point. This suggests a stronger riskreturn relation in companies below the reference point. This patterns are similar with previous research (Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009) and
Patel, Li, and Park (2017)).
Three control variables were also added into
the model adopted from the research by Gupta
(2017), namely company size, leverage, and
company age. In his research, the direction of
the control variables’ relationship is not explained explicitly. At the market level, two of

10

Nuir and Asri: Bowman’s Paradox: Prospect-Theory-Based Risk-Return Relationship
R. S. Sajjad and M. Asri / Indonesian Capital Market Review 11 (2019) 1-14

Figure 1. Risk-return relation for all companies with market median as reference point

Figure 2. Risk-return relation for all companies with industry median as reference point

the three control variables show a negative and
significant relationship for companies below
the reference point. Only one control variable
shows a positive relationship, namely company
age. While for the companies above the reference point, there is only one control variable
that shows a positive relationship with the dependent variable, and is nearly the same as the
results for the market level regression. But the
results are similar to those in the research by
Gupta (2017). In his research, there is no definite pattern of relationship for the control variables. This relation could be the focus for later
empirical studies.
In a simpler manner, the overall results of
the regression model show the prospect-theory-based risk-return paradox phenomenon is
present in Indonesian companies. Based on
the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), the risk-return paradox only occured in
companies in a loss position. Companies with-

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2019

out the ability to create returns above the reference point or that are in the loss condition will
try to select any investment with higher risk,
though with a lower return. The adverse logic
behavior is described completely in research
by Miller and Bromiley (1991). Their research
assumed that each company establishes a performance target by taking guidelines from the
market or industry performance mean, and that
there are many available investment options to
be selected by the managers. Each investment
assessment is based on risk and return and will
be added to the company’s overall performance.
In Miller and Bromiley (1991), a company
that is not able to achieve its target will sacrifice
its returns to increase its return variance. Projects with high return variance will be able to
create enormous returns, although with a very
small probability. This behavior happens because the company does not want to continue to
be in a loss-making position and will choose an
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investment that may restore the company's position, no matter how much risk the investment
may have (Kliger and Tsur, 2011). The greater
that the loss position of a company is, will lead
to more investments with a high return variance
being undertaken by the company. This will
cause a greater distance between risk and return. The company's loss position will also lead
to further position from the reference point. The
above explanation explains the occurrence of a
negative risk-return relation for a company under the reference point. In general, companies
in Indonesia with poor performance exhibit
behavior such as that in the above explanation.
That behavior will cause a risk-return paradox
in the below-target firms.
Unlike firms with below the reference point
returns, there is no sign of a negative risk-return relation in companies with returns above
the reference point. The companies with returns
above the reference point in our sample generally have larger total assets and are older, and
thus have stronger market power, which would
cause the risk-return paradox as stated in Woo
(1987), but the relationship is still a positive
one. This behavior could be justified if we refer
to Kliger and Tsur’s (2011) study. According to
Kliger and Tsur (2011), a well-performing company will only take more risks when it knows it
will obtain greater returns. Better company performance will cause smaller companies to take
more risks. Thus, when companies with good
performance dare to take investment options
with more risks, there will be higher returns to
be earned too. This underlies a positive riskreturn relation for the companies above the reference point. In general, companies with good
performance in Indonesia show the behavior
described above.
For the regression results at the industry
level, they show relatively similar results to the
regression at the market level. There is a negative risk-return relation for the companies under the reference point, which proves the first
hypothesis. Also, a positive risk-return relation
for the companies above the reference point
is found, which proves the second hypothesis.
This indicates that in general, in Indonesia, the
prospect-theory-based risk-return paradox is in
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both reference points, the market and industry
median of returns.

Conclusion
This research was conducted to examine the
relationship between risk and return for Indonesian companies using the prospect theory
approach and to adopt the research models by
Chou, Chou, and Ko (2009) and Gupta (2017).
This research used all the companies registered
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in the period
from 2008 to 2017. Return on Assets (ROA)
was used as the independent variable and the
standard deviation of ROA was used as the
dependent variable. This research also used
three control variables that were adopted from
research by Gupta (2017). The three variables
were company size, company risk, and company age.
Overall, the results are similar to previous
empirical studies (Fiegenbaum and Thomas
(1988), Fiegenbaum (1990), Chou, Chou, and
Ko (2009)) and support all the hypotheses proposed. This indicates that companies facing
losses tend to be more willing to take alternative
investments, with higher risks but lower profit
levels. The attempt is made to try to restore the
company’s position from a loss position to the
profit position. A company with good performance will be willing to take higher risks if the
profits earned from the investment are greater
than the risks.
The addition of three control variables in
this research also indicates significant effects
on some models. There are many studies into
Bowman’s paradox and the prospect theory
that do not add any control variables into the
research. The variables’ addition is expected to
add robustness to the research model, as in the
research by Gupta (2017). Although in this research, the data used are in the form of a pooled
cross-section, control variables in the form
of company size, leverage, and company age
show significant effects on the research model
in its cross-sectional manner. Though it could
not ensure the theoretical effects of the control
variables, this can be studied further as a new
research topic by other researchers.
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